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Much Ado About the TPP's Effect
on Pharmaceuticals
Emily Michiko Morris*
ABSTRACT
The many provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
that were beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry caused a good deal of
controversy. Specifically, critics alleged that the TPP's provisions requiring
that member states expand patentable subject matter and adjust pharmaceuti-
cal patent terms would have raised drug prices and hindered access to
medicines, particularly in developing countries. But closer examination of
these provisions, as well as the various ways in which member states can
modify or ameliorate the effects of these provisions, suggests that their po-
tential effect on drug prices and access to health care is not nearly so clear.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks in part to the secrecy under which it was negotiated, and the
U.S. presidential campaigns in which it was debated, the now defunct mul-
tinational trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has
proven to be quite controversial.' The agreement contains provisions on a
large number of subjects, including human rights, the environment, and labor
standards.2 Among the most controversial provisions, however, are those ad-
dressing pharma-friendly intellectual property (IP) rights, mainly in the form
of expanded patent protections, as well as multiple IP-like regulatory protec-
tions unique to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.3 These
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1. Steven Seidenberg, Turmoil in the Pacific: A Controversial Trade Agreement
Raises Questions About How Disputes Should Be Resolved Between Govern-
ments and Private Corporations, 102 A.B.A. J. 54, 55-56 (2016); Nick Florko
& Valerie Holdford, Secret TPP Text Unveiled: It's Worse Than We Thought,
With Limits on Food Safety and Controversial Investor-State System Expanded,
Rollback of Bush-Era Medicine Access and Environmental Terms, PUBLIC CrI-
ZEN (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?
ID=5724.
2. David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the Pacific
Rim, 33 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 57, 60 (2016).
3. See Jing Luo & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Protecting Pharmaceutical Patents and
Test Data: How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Could Affect Access
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pharma-friendly provisions go above and beyond the baselines set in The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), signed by World Trade Organization (WTO) member states twenty
years ago to set minimum levels for intellectual property rights.4 Defenders
of the TPP argue that the enhancements on the TRIPS baselines, often re-
ferred to as TRIPS-plus provisions, are necessary both to protect the pharma-
ceutical research and development investments in developed countries and to
attract investments in domestic pharmaceutical research and development in
less developed countries.5 Critics, by contrast, issue warnings that the TPP's
pharma-friendly provisions will raise pharmaceutical prices and reduce ac-
cess to medicines by blocking the availability of lower-cost generic copies, a
result that would be particularly harmful to developing countries.6 Despite
the discourse flowing from both sides on the issue, the actual effect the
TPP's pharma-friendly provisions might have had-if it had been ratified-
is far from clear.
The TPP, of course, no longer seems to be a viable agreement. Now that
the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, the other countries that
originally signed are unlikely to move forward with ratification.7 The TPP
nonetheless provides a useful point of departure for analyzing the potential
effect of pharma-friendly trade agreement provisions on drug costs and ac-
cess to medicine. First, almost all of the pharma-friendly provisions in the
to Medicines in the US and Abroad, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 727, 727-35 (2016);
Matthew E. Silverman, The Case for Flexible Intellectual Property Protections
in The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 27 J.L. & HEALTH 215, 219 (2014).
4. Mohammed K. El-Said, TRIPS-Plus, Public Health and Performance-Based
Rewards Schemes Options and Supplements for Policy Formation in Develop-
ing and Least Developed Countries, 31 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 373, 408-10
(2016).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trade Enhancing Ac-
cess to Medicines (Sept. 2011), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/201 1/september/trade-enhancing-access-medicines; see
also KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 186-94 (2000) (analyzing this argument).
6. E.g., El-Said, supra note 4; Burcu Kilic et al., What Is Patentable Under the
Trans-Pacific Partnership? An Analysis of the Free Trade Agreement's Patent-
ability Provisions from a Public Health Perspective, 40 YALE J. INTL. L. ON-
LNE 1, 4-5 (2015); Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High Price of
"Free" Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 199, 207-08 (2013); Brook K. Baker, US Trade-Enhancing Access
to Medicines (Access Window) in Its Proposed TPP IP Text is a Sham, IN-
FOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 25, 2011), http://infojustice.org/resource-library/us-trade-
enhancing-access-to-medicines-access-window-in-its-proposed-tpp-ip-text-is-
a-sham.
7. TPP: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715.
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TPP have appeared in some form in previous U.S.-negotiated free trade
agreements (FTAs).8 Because these earlier agreements are still relatively
new, it may be too early to determine with any accuracy exactly what effect
they have had on access to medicine9-what little evidence available is hotly
disputed.o Nonetheless, knowing whether and how the signatories to the ear-
lier agreements have implemented the pharma-friendly provisions in the ear-
lier agreements can help reveal the extent to which states have found ways to
soften or sidestep the effect of these provisions. Second, depending on the
new White House administration's attitude toward trade agreements, the TPP
is likely to serve as a model for future trade negotiations between the United
States and its trade partners-and perhaps others."
The analysis below takes a closer look at the most controversial of the
TPP's pharma-friendly patent provisions. The TPP's expansion of patentable
subject matter to include new uses of known products, including
pharmaceuticals, is seen as fostering broader and longer patent exclusivity
over drugs, leading to more monopolistic rights and their attendant
supracompetitive pricing.12 Likewise, the TPP's requirement that patent
terms be adjusted for unreasonable delays due to patent prosecution or regu-
latory marketing approval processes also could have the effect of prolonging
patent exclusivity over drugs.13 Even the TPP's requirement that government
8. Lee Branstetter, TPP and the Conflict Over Drugs: Incentives for Innovation
Versus Access to Medicines, in 2 THE PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., As-
SESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: INNOVATIONS IN TRADE RULES 1,
20, 30 (Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino-Issacs eds., 2016).
9. Amy Kapczynski et al., The TPP and Drug Prices: Not a Settled Matter, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-
10-28/tpp-and-drug-prices.
10. Compare Gargi Chakrabarti, Need of Data Exclusivity: Impact on Access to
Medicine, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. RTs. 325, 332 (2014), and Lopert & Gleeson,
supra note 6, at 202, and Mike Palmedo, Do Pharmaceutical Firms Invest
More Heavily in Countries with Data Exclusivity?, 21 SUM CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 38, 39 (2013), and Ctr. for Econ. Policy and Research, Prescription
Drugs and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Big Pharma Hit by Skills Shortage,
BEAT THE PRESS (Mar. 26, 2016), http://cepr.net/blogs/beat-the-press/prescrip-
tion-drugs-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership-big-pharma-hit-by-skills-shortage,
with Branstetter, supra note 8, at 11, and Thomas J. Bollyky, A Dose of the
TPP's Medicine: Why U.S. Trade Deals Haven't Exported U.S. Drug Prices,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
2016-03-23/dose-tpps-medicine.
11. Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 206-07; Palmedo, supra note 10, at 39.
12. Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines-Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33 (2015); Kilic et
al., supra note 6, at 4-6.
13. Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 201.
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regulatory agencies link marketing approval of generic drugs to the patent
status of those drugs (so-called patent linkage) is seen as extending patent
exclusivities.14
The implications of the TPP's pharma-friendly patent provisions depend
not only on the express text of the provisions themselves, but also on the
many explicit and implicit flexibitities TPP signatories have in implementing
these provisions. The analysis below looks at the most controversial patent-
related provisions in the TPP that could affect pharmaceutical prices and
availability. First, is the provision at issue subject to any express or implied
exceptions that would allow developing countries to limit exclusive rights
over drugs? Second, do signatory countries have flexibility, whether explic-
itly through what the TPP stipulates or implicitly through what it does not, in
how countries can implement the pharma-friendly provision domestically?
Third, what flexibilities do signatory countries have, whether express or in-
ferred, in deciding how to incorporate any given provision into domestic
law? In looking at the final draft of the TPP, we can see that members of the
TPP were surprisingly successful in negotiating for themselves a fair amount
of flexibility. Had the TPP been ratified, this flexibility would have given
signatories significant leeway to limit the accretion of exclusive rights over
pharmaceuticals.
The discussion here is necessarily brief and incomplete as it is intended
only as a survey of the TPP's pharma-friendly patent provisions and the flex-
ibilities available to its signatories for implementing those provisions. There
are many other provisions in the TPP, other international agreements, and
other external elements that are not covered in detail here that, patent exclu-
sivities notwithstanding, could have a huge impact on access to medicines.
Chief among these is the TPP's requirement that signatories grant pharma-
ceutical firms additional, IP-like rights of exclusivity over data used to sup-
port regulatory marketing approval.15 Still, other TPP provisions could have
had an even more direct effect on drug price and availability, such as the
TPP's provisions on drug price controls, patent exhaustion, and compulsory
licensing. 16
On the other hand, countries that have attempted to moderate pharma-
ceutical prices either directly through measures such as price controls or indi-
rectly through their patent systems have faced possible backlash for their
efforts.17 Such backlash occasionally takes the form of trade sanctions, but
more often as dispute settlement proceedings, like those between member
14. D.G. Shah, Impact of the TPP on the Pharma Industry, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/12/02/impact-of-the-tpp-on-the-
pharma-industry/.
15. El-Said, supra note 4, at 400.
16. Id. at 400; see infra text accompanying notes 186-200.
17. El-Said, supra note 4, at 401-03.
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countries under TRIPS.18 Now, under the TPP and other recently U.S.-nego-
tiated FTAs, signatories face further challenges from private parties through
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings.19 The potential for such
reprisals may explain why most of the United States' trade agreement part-
ners historically have not taken full advantage of the flexibilities and
workarounds available to them for implementing the IP provisions in those
agreements. 20 Further, the threat of reprisal could have deterred TPP signato-
ries from making use of the flexibilities and workarounds allowed to them
under the TPP. The discussion here merely mentions these additional factors
without analyzing them in detail, but they are important aspects of the overall
discussion of the potential impact of trade agreements on access to
medicines.
II. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
From what began as an agreement between the "Pacific Four" trade bloc
countries of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, the TPP evolved
into a much larger trade agreement that included Australia, Canada, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam as well.21 A final
draft was signed on February 4, 2016, in Auckland, New Zealand, but for the
TPP to take effect, at least six member states comprising at least eighty-five
percent of the gross domestic product of the signatory countries would have
had to ratify it.22 This became impossible when the newly inaugurated Presi-
dent of the United States immediately signed an executive order withdrawing
the United States from the TPP.23
A wide-ranging and ambitious pact, the TPP has been heavily criticized
on many counts, particularly for its provisions on pharmaceuticals. These
include the TPP's articles on patentable subject matter, patent term adjust-
ments, patent linkage, and regulatory exclusivities over data submitted for
marketing approval-all of which can significantly expand a pharmaceutical
18. Id. at 420-32; see infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
19. El-Said, supra note 5, at 400; see infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
20. Richard D. Smith et al., Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals, 373 LANCET 684,
684 (2009); Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS
Game?, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 339 (2011).
21. Burcu Kilic, Defending the Spirit of the Doha Declaration in Free Trade
Agreements: Trans-Pacific Partnership and Access to Affordable Medicines,
12 Loy. U. CM. INT'L L. REv. 23, 33-34 (2014); Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 1
n.5.
22. Seidenberg, supra note 1, at 55; Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed
in Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
35480600.
23. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama's Signature
Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/
us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html?r-0.
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firm's ability to maintain the firm's monopolistic rights over its drug prod-
ucts by delaying market entry of lower-priced generic versions of the same
drugs. Given that pharmaceutical firms in the United States already earn phe-
nomenal returns just from the domestic market alone,24 delaying generic mar-
ket entry and raising drug prices in other countries that are trading partners
with the United States is unnecessary. 25 Critics see these provisions as impos-
ing the ideals of the developed Western world on non-Western developing
countries and catering to the pharmaceutical industry's greed at the expense
of access to medicines.26
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and
others, by contrast, have characterized the TPP's pharma provisions as a
good balance between maintaining incentives for pharmaceutical innovation
and safeguarding access to medicines.27 Supporters of the TPP's pharma-
friendly provisions point out that pharmaceutical innovation is expensive and
that the costs have thus far been borne chiefly by patients in wealthy, devel-
oped countries such as the United States.28 At least one economist has argued
that as the U.S. population ages and as the rise in health care costs in the
United States continues to outstrip income, the pharmaceutical industry will
no longer be able to support research and development (R&D) on revenues
from the United States alone.29 Pharmaceutical R&D, at least in wealthier,
developed countries like the United States, is known to be heavily dependent
on patent protections.30 Greater patent and other protections for pharmaceuti-
cal innovations abroad may therefore be necessary to maintain adequate re-
sources for research.31 In any event, these proponents say that international
harmonization of intellectual property rights and marketing approval regula-
tions make it easier for pharma firms to introduce their products to other
markets quickly and cheaply. 32
24. Ian Gustafson, TPP Pharmaceuticals, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Apr.
11, 2016), http://www.coha.org/tpp-pharmaceuticals/.
25. Id.
26. Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Rela-
tions: Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the Trips Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 191, 239-40 (2014).
27. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 31.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 30; Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 303
(2008); Silverman, supra note 3, at 226.
31. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 30.
32. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1571, 1571
(2009).
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Regardless of the justifications for the TPP's heightened protections for
pharmaceuticals, concerns about the effects of these protections on access to
medicines in developing and least-developed countries are understandable.
The TPP will not affect the vast majority of drugs, particularly those on the
World Health Organization's Model List of Essential Medicines, as the pat-
ent and regulatory exclusivities for these drugs have expired or were never
available.33 But, for drugs that are developed in the future, patent and data
exclusivities could have a profound impact on pricing and availability, and
many have voiced their objection to the TPP on these grounds.34
That being said, the negotiating parties were more successful than many
might have expected in pushing to remove and modify several controversial
provisions from the final draft of the TPP, as the discussion below explains.35
A number of the TPP member states not only objected to many of the initial
proposals that favored the pharma industry, but also floated their own
counterproposals.36
The language in many parts of the final draft of the TPP arguably re-
flects this more liberal tone. For example, Article 18.3 of the TPP's intellec-
tual property chapter stipulates that a signatory country "may, in formulating
or amending its laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition . . . provided that such measures are consistent
with the provisions of this Chapter."37 Article 18.6 of the same chapter states
that the negotiating parties "affirm their commitment to the Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health," and that
[t]he obligations of this [intellectual property] Chapter do not and
should not prevent a Party from taking measures to protect public
health. Accordingly, while reiterating their commitment to this
Chapter, the Parties affirm that this Chapter can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of each
Party's right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all.38
33. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 26; Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines, supra
note 5, at 3.
34. See, e.g., Trading Away Health: The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP), DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (2013), http://www.doctorswithoutbord
ers.org/news-stories/briefing-document/trading-away-health-trans-pacific-part
nership-agreement-tpp.
35. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 28.
36. Id. at 20; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
37. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. art. 18.3, Feb. 4,
2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP].
38. Id. art. 18.6.
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These statements provided a background against which the TPP's signatories
could interpret its pharma-friendly provisions in a way most conducive to
public health and access to medicines.
HI. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
The first of the TPP's pharma-friendly provisions is Article 18.37.2's
extension of patentable subject matter to include new uses of known prod-
ucts, including pharmaceuticals.39 This provision is suspected of allowing
pharmaceutical companies to "evergreen" their patent rights and extend their
patent monopolies by repeatedly filing new patents on alternative uses of
already existing drugs.40 This expansion of patentable subject matter is ar-
gued to lead to sequential patents on "dubious or marginally used" indica-
tions for drugs that are used simply to prolong patent monopolies and
increase prices with no countervailing benefit to health outcomes. 4 1 Critics
claim that such sequential patenting can prolong patent protections for up to
six or seven years after the original patent on the active ingredient itself.42
Some countries, such as India, have therefore prohibited such sequential pat-
enting on new uses or new forms of existing drugs, a move that is thought to
have helped foster India's sizable generic drug industry.43
It is important to first note that, regardless of whether they ultimately
contribute to social welfare, new-use patents on existing drugs are not, as
some have suggested, merely renewals of the patent on the drug itself.44 The
concept of evergreening presupposes that the new use or other sequential
innovation on which subsequent patent rights are based are not technologi-
cally advanced enough to warrant additional patent protection and that subse-
quent patents on a known drug are broad enough in scope to prevent any
meaningful use of the drug while the patent is in effect.45 Although incre-
mental in nature, sequential patents on new uses are in fact separate patents
39. Article 18.37.2 of the TPP states:
Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4 and consistent with paragraph 1, each Party
confirms that patents are available for inventions claimed as at least one of
the following: new uses of a known product, new methods of using a
known product, or new processes of using a known product. A Party may
limit those new processes to those that do not claim the use of the product
as such.
TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.37.2.
40. Gustafson, supra note 24; Shah, supra note 14.
41. Gustafson, supra note 24; Silverman, supra note 3, at 228.
42. Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 3, at 729.
43. Amy Kapczynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership-Is It Bad for Your Health?,
373 N. ENGL. J. MED. 201, 201-02 (2015).
44. Gustafson, supra note 24.
45. Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 4-5.
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that must satisfy all of the same patentability requirements that active ingre-
dient patents must satisfy, including novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.46
Thus, although they may not contribute significantly to general health out-
comes, patentable new uses of existing drugs do at least enjoy the presump-
tion of contributing some new advantages.47
More importantly, patents on a new use of an existing drug are much
narrower in scope than a patent on the active ingredient in the drug itself.48
Once the patent on the active ingredient patent expires, it can be used freely
for any unpatented use, including the use for which it was originally pat-
ented, without fear of infringement liability.49 In fact, such new-use patents
may be particularly ineffectual because other producers of the underlying
drug can merely carve out the new use from their labeling for the drug,
thereby officially advising purchasers and prescribers that their versions of
the drug are indicated only for off-patent or licensed uses.50
On that note, it is also interesting to observe what subject matter was
ultimately excluded from the patentability requirements of the final draft of
Article 18.37. The United States' original proposal would have required that
diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic methods be patentable subject matter,51
along with new forms of known drugs.52 Neither of these proposals remained
in the final draft, however,53 and the United States and Australia continue to
be the only countries that allow patents on diagnostic, surgical, and therapeu-
tic methods.54 The effect of excluding new forms of known drugs could be
significant-after Argentina changed its laws in 2012 to exclude new drug
46. Baker & Geddes, supra note 12, at 33.
47. Id.
48. Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Com-
petition in the US. The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10 PHARMACO-
ECONOMICS 110, 121 (1996); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When
Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613,
619-20 (2011).
49. John Thomas, Patent Eligibility, PHARMACEUTICAL PAT. L. (BNA), pt. II, ch. 2
(3d ed. 2005); Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32,
at 1591.
50. See 21 U.S.C.A § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30).
51. Kilic, supra note 21, at 39; Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 14-15.
52. Kilic, supra note 21, at 39.
53. Id. at 40; Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 14-15.
54. Kilic, supra note 21, at 39. Articles 18.37.3-18.37.4 state that signatories may
exclude from patentability "(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans or animals; (b) animals other than microorganisms,
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals,
other than non-biological and microbiological processes," as well as "plants
other than microorganisms," as long as "patents are available at least for inven-
tions that are derived from plants." TPP, supra note 37, arts. 18.37.3-18.37.4.
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forms, the number of pharmaceutical patents granted appeared to drop drasti-
cally as compared to other countries in the region.55
Moreover, to the extent that sequential patents on new uses under Arti-
cle 18.37 in its final, more limited form do foster evergreening, individual
states can further limit the risk both directly and indirectly through domestic
law. Many have focused on the negotiation of the TPP and other FTAs, but
have not paid as much heed to the implementation of such agreements, in
which some signatories, especially the larger developing countries such as
Brazil, India, and South Africa, have had more success in tailoring imple-
mentation to suit their own specific needs.56
Heightened patentability requirements directly limit the risk of ever-
greening by limiting the possibility of acquiring further patent rights on
known products.57 Even if they qualify as patentable subject matter, new uses
of known substances often will not meet the requirements for patentability
and are particularly vulnerable to validity challenges by generic manufactur-
ers.58 Flexibility in heightening the patentability requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness (or inventive step), utility (or industrial application), and dis-
closure may further limit pharma's ability to patent new uses of existing
drugs.59 The TPP circumscribes flexibility with regard to some of the patent-
ability requirements to a limited degree, but for the most part TPP signatories
are ostensibly free to adapt their patentability requirements as they see fit.60
Canada and India have employed such tactics by raising their respective
patentability requirements in ways that have greatly limited the ability of
pharmaceuticals to obtain sequential patents.61 Section 3(d) of India's Patent
Act states that "the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance
which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that sub-
stance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known
55. GERMRN VELASQUEZ, GUIDELINES ON PATENTABILITY AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 19 (Mar. 2015), http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/RP61_Guidelines-on-Patentability-and-A2MEN.pdf.
56. M. Monirul Azam, Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and
Policy Options for the LDCs: The Context of Bangladesh, 13 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 402, 406 (2014); Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better
Trips Game?, supra note 20, at 324.
57. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 304.
58. Id.
59. CARLOS M. CORREA, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS: DEVELOPING A PunLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 18-20 (2007), http://
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/guidelines-for-the-
examination-of-patent-applications-relating-t.htnl.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 23-24, 36.
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substance" cannot be patented.62 Although Section 3(d) is not limited to phar-
maceutical inventions, it was enacted with the purpose of promoting access
to medicines by reducing the risk of evergreening.63 Section 3(d) therefore
not only prohibits patenting of many new drug forms that lack superior effi-
cacy, but also all new uses of known drugs, regardless of their therapeutic
value.64 India is not a member of the TPP, and most countries do not have
such strict patentability standards,65 but other countries have already fol-
lowed India's lead. The Philippines have recently adopted a provision similar
to Section 3(d),66 as has Argentina.67
Canada's utility requirement takes a slightly different tack on raising the
patentability bar. In recent years Canada has interpreted its patent law as
requiring that a patent application must either demonstrate or soundly predict
that the covered invention will work for any utility expressed or merely im-
plied in the application.68 This "promise doctrine" is designed to prevent pat-
enting until an inventor has conducted adequate research to support
patentability69 and may be particularly effective with regard to pharmaceuti-
cal patents. 70 Dozens of drug patents have been invalidated under the promise
doctrine,71 although it is not clear how many of these invalidated pharmaceu-
tical patents were evergreening-type sequential patents.
62. Patents Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE sec. 3 (2005), http://indiacode.nic.in;
Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 5.
63. Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32, at 1590-91;
Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 5.
64. Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32, at 1590.
65. El-Said, supra note 4, at 405-08; Kapczynski et al., supra note 9.
66. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 22, as amended by Rep. Act 8293 (Phil.),
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou e/s_sonota-e/fips-e/pdf/philippinese/etizai
.pdf; El-Said, supra note 4, at 407.
67. Res. Nos. 118/2012, 546/2012, 107/2012, May 8, 2012 (Arg.), http://www
.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13007; Rajarshi Banerjee, Note, The Suc-
cess of and Response to, India's Law Against Patent Layering, 54 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 204, 228-29 (2013) (also banning new forms of known drugs even if they
demonstrate enhanced efficacy).
68. Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic
Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 226-27 (2015);
Mark D. Penner, Increased Utility Requirements in Canada? How the "Prom-
ise Doctrine" Has Challenged Patentees and What Can Be Done to Address
These Challenges, LAWYERISSUE (July 3, 2015), http://www.lawyerissue.com/
increased-utility-requirements-in-canada-how-the-promise-doctrine-has-chal-
lenged-patentees-and-what-can-be-done-to-address-these-challenges/; Kilic et
al., supra note 6, at 7-8.
69. Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 7-8.
70. Baker & Geddes, supra note 12, at 43-44.
71. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 68, at 236.
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India was not a party to the TPP, but both India's and Canada's height-
ened standards did not go unnoticed during TPP negotiations.72 The TPP ne-
gotiating parties debated over the utility requirement, and although India's
Section 3(d) is technically a patentable subject matter restriction,73 the United
States and Japan wanted the TPP to disallow denials of patents on known
products "solely on the basis that the product did not result in an enhanced
efficacy of the known product," a restriction that would have directly fore-
stalled adoption of analogs to India's Section 3(d).74 This proposed language
is now conspicuous by its absence, again signaling its likely opposition from
other TPP member states.75
Earlier drafts of the TPP also contained language that seemed to target
more stringent utility standards such as Canada's promise doctrine.76 This
earlier language would have required patentability for anything that has "spe-
cific, substantial, and credible utility,"77 the utility standard that U.S. patent
law applies.78 Although subtle, the difference between the more lenient "spe-
cific, substantial, and credible utility" standard and Canada's more demand-
ing "soundly predicted" utility standard was apparently significant.79 A
majority of the TPP negotiating parties objected to this attempt to restrict
their flexibility to set their own patentability standards,80 and any reference to
"specific, substantial, and credible utility" is also conspicuous by its
absence.81
The final draft of the TPP does somewhat constrain flexibility with re-
gard to the novelty and inventive step (non-obviousness) requirements. Arti-
cle 18.38 of the final draft stipulates that, in determining both novelty and
inventive step, each party "shall disregard at least information contained in
public disclosures" if the information was disclosed by or from the patent
applicant less than twelve months before the application filing date.82 This
provision thus cabins the universe of prior art on which each party can rely to
disprove an invention's novelty or inventive step, effectively lowering the
72. Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32, at 1596-98.
73. CORREA, supra note 59, at 12; Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents,
supra note 32, at 1590.
74. Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 6.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 7-8.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, passim (Jan. 5, 2001).
79. Kilic et al., supra note 6, at 7-8.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.38 (emphasis added).
146 [Vol. XX
2017] Much Ado About the TPP's Effect on Pharmaceuticals
bar for patentability.83 This may affect the TPP signatories' ability to weed
out sequential patents suspected of evergreening exclusivity over
pharmaceuticals. That said, there are still a number of flexibilities that signa-
tories can exert in limiting the patentability of pharmaceuticals or other in-
ventions under the novelty and inventive step requirements.
India, for example, has set a high threshold for proving "inventive step"
by requiring not only that an invention be nonobvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art, but also that the invention demonstrate some "techni-
cal advance" or "economic significance."84 The additional requirements of
"technical advance" or "economic significance" could be used effectively to
limit patentability for many inventions.85 China has similarly tightened its
non-obviousness standard,86 which requires "prominent substantive features
and . . . remarkable advancements" over existing technologies.87 In fact, at
least one commentator has specifically called for application of standards of
non-obviousness and inventive step more rigorous than those used in the
United States, specifically for pharmaceuticals.88 The novelty requirement
also allows great leeway.89 Individual countries can choose how easily to
imply the presence of an invention in the prior art,90 whether to rely on a
single or multiple prior art references in determining an invention's nov-
elty,91 or other potential measures for narrowing the boundaries for novelty.
And in addition to the stringency or leniency of a given party's substan-
tive patentability requirements, the rigor of a party's domestic procedural
processes for examining and issuing patents could also help curb patents on
pharmaceuticals or other technologies. Pre-grant oppositions to patent appli-
cations are a procedural mechanism that uses third-party challenges to help
83. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 9.
84. Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32, at 1593.
85. Id.
86. El-Said, supra note 4, at 406-07.
87. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 22,
2008 P.R.C. Laws (China). Literally translated, Article 22 refers to "creativity"
rather than non-obviousness or inventive step.
88. E.g., CORREA, supra note 59, at 15-16 (advocating use of a variety of factors,
not just prior art references, and use of more than unexpected results from
something that one might otherwise be expected to try).
89. Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competi-
tion Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 30 (1997)
("[T]here is no agreed international standard of absolute novelty, and, within
limits, the developing countries may pick and choose from among the different
approaches recognized in the domestic patent laws.").
90. CORREA, supra note 59, at 13-14 (calling for liberal use of the inherency
doctrine).
91. Id. at 8.
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identify patents and patent claims that should not be issued.92 Although pat-
ents can be invalidated after issuance, preventing the issuance of weak patent
claims, such as those that might be found in sequential new-use patents,
avoids the over-deterrence of competitors as well as expensive litigation later
in court. 93 Of course, pre-grant (and post-grant) oppositions are only effective
if interested third parties have adequate access to the information necessary
for such challenges, 94 but pre-grant oppositions have been used quite suc-
cessfully in India to challenge pharmaceutical patents and protect the robust
generic industry.95
Previous U.S.-negotiated FTAs have included provisions precluding
pre-grant oppositions, including the FTA between the United States and Ko-
rea96 and the FTAs between the United States and Singapore, Morocco,
Bahrain, and Oman.97 Unsurprisingly, the United States made a similar pro-
posal during TPP negotiations, but a 2013 counterproposal submitted jointly
by Australia, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore insisted
on maintaining the flexibility to allow either pre-grant or post-grant third-
party oppositions.98 The United States subsequently withdrew its proposal to
bar pre-grant oppositions99 and indeed has itself recently ramped up its own
administrative procedures for third-party opposition to pending patent appli-
cations under the America Invents Act. 100
More indirect methods of limiting evergreening and its effects also can
be adopted through specific exemptions to infringement liability. Article
18.40 of the TPP final draft explicitly permits parties to impose "limited ex-
ceptions" to patent rights, "provided that such exceptions do not unreasona-
bly conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
92. Kilic, supra note 21, at 42-43; Krista Cox, TPP Negotiating Parties' Counter-
proposal to the US on Medicines Represents a More Flexible Approach,
KNOWLEDGE EcON. INT'L (Nov. 14, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1826.
93. Cox, supra note 92; Kilic, supra note 21, at 42-43; Kevin Outterson, Pharma-
ceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescrip-
tion Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHIcs 193, 257-58 (2005)
(warning that merely filing a patent application may deter generic market entry
in some instances).
94. Azam, supra note 56, at 441-42.
95. Cox, supra note 92.
96. Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 203.
97. Smith et al., supra note 20, at 687.
98. Cox, supra note 92.
99. Kilic, supra note 21, at 43.
100. Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to
the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 113-15 (2011).
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legitimate interests of third parties."lo One widely accepted example of such
an exception is included in the TPP itself. Article 18.49 of the TPP stipulates
that each TPP signatory "shall adopt or maintain a regulatory review excep-
tion for pharmaceutical patents."02 This reference to a "regulatory review
exception" refers to what is commonly known in the United States as the
"Bolar exception," which exempts from patent infringement liability any pre-
market testing of a patented drug for the purpose of obtaining regulatory
marketing approval.1 03 This exception expedites market entry by generic drug
marketers by authorizing them to prepare for sale of the drug immediately
upon patent expiry.104 It is noteworthy that many of the TPP signatories were
again successful in pushing back on proposals to cabin the Bolar exception
by limiting it to only product patents and to only the territory of the country
granting the exception.1 05 Article 18.49 uses the term "pharmaceutical pat-
ents" rather than "pharmaceutical products" or "product patents," and a foot-
note to the Article states that "consistent with Article 18.40 (Exceptions),
nothing prevents a Party from providing that regulatory review exceptions
apply for purposes of regulatory reviews in that Party, in another country or
both."106 On the other hand, TPP signatories were not successful in pushing
for an even broader experimental-use exception that would also have sup-
ported use of a patented invention for determining how the invention works,
its scope, its validity, or how to improve on the invention.107
Analogous exceptions to medical patent rights can be found outside of
the TPP as well. Section 287(c) of the Patent Act in the United States, for
one, grants fairly broad immunity from patent infringement liability to "med-
ical practitioners" and "related health care entities" who use patented medical
procedures.os The effect of Section 287(c) is to give medical practitioners
and health care entities an immediate, royalty-free, compulsory license to
101. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.40.
102. Id. art. 18.49.
103. Okediji, supra note 26, at 246-47 (noting that the United States' statutory Bo-
lar exception expressly overrules the United States Federal Circuit court deci-
sion in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858,
863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that no such experimental-use exception ex-
isted at common law).
104. Id.
105. Stefano Barazza, The Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Its Im-
plications for Public Health and Access to Medicines: The UNITAID Report, 5
EUR. J. RISK REG. 366, 369 (2014).
106. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.49 n.49.
107. Cox, supra note 92.
108. 35 U.S.C.A § 287(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30); see also Cynthia
M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 601 (2000) (analyzing Section 287(c) in depth).
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such patents, albeit with some important limitations.1o Although much more
bounded in scope, Article 78 of Australia's 1990 Patent Act also provides for
patent infringement immunity, specifically singling out patented pharmaceu-
tical substances used for non-therapeutic purposes or in unpatented forms. Io
The exemption also applies only during the extended term of the patent if it
was granted a term extension under Australian law. The Australian exemp-
tion therefore may not be as useful in combatting evergreening-type sequen-
tial patents as the Section 287(c) of U.S. patent law.
Another example of an exception that may be of particular benefit to
countries such as India, which only relatively recently began granting patents
on pharmaceutical substances,I is prior-user rights. To "grandfather" in ge-
neric drug manufacturers who were already producing drugs that later were
granted patent rights under Indian law, India effectively gave generic manu-
facturers immediate compulsory licenses to these patents by granting the
manufacturers prior-user rights.112 Generic manufacturers who made "signifi-
cant investment" in producing and marketing a drug, and were in fact doing
so prior to January 1, 2005, may continue to do so if they pay a reasonable
royalty to the later patent holder.13 And while India's prior-user rights are
thus subject to exceptions, Brazil's prior-user rights are unrestricted and
guarantee that prior users are "assured [of] the right to continue the exploita-
tion, without onus, in the same manner and under the same conditions as
before."] 14
IV. PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENTS
Other IP provisions in the TPP that raise similar concerns are those in
Articles 18.46 and 18.48, which require patent-term adjustments to compen-
sate for "unreasonable" delays in either the patent prosecution and regulatory
marketing approval processes." 5 Like the patentable subject matter expan-
sions in Article 18.37, the patent term adjustments under TPP Articles 18.46
and 18.48 have been criticized as unduly prolonging patent monopolies.116
But, like the patentable subject matter provisions, both Articles 18.46 and
18.48 could be limited directly and indirectly through a member state's do-
mestic patent laws. More importantly, nothing in either Article 18.46 or
18.48 specifies what kind of adjustments states must make or for how long.
109. See generally Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 68.
110. El-Said, supra note 4, at 426-27.
111. Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, supra note 32, at 1576.
112. Azam, supra note 56, at 439-40.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 439-40 (quoting No. 9.279 art. 45, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial
Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 15.05.1996. (Port.)).
115. TPP, supra note 37, arts. 18.46, 18.48.
116. Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 201.
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Indeed, Article 18.48 does not even specify what kind of marketing-approval
delays constitute such an "unreasonable curtailment'' of patent term that ad-
justments must be made. Member states therefore retain a fair amount of
flexibility in limiting the effects of these provisions on their domestic phar-
maceutical markets.
Article 18.46 of the TPP's intellectual property chapter addresses delays
in processing patent applications. The Article first exhorts member states to
make "best efforts to process patent applications in an efficient and timely
manner" and "to avoid unreasonable or unnecessary delays,"117 but then man-
dates that, if "unreasonable delays" nonetheless occur, the member "shall
provide the means to, and at the request of the patent owner shall, adjust the
term of the patent" in compensation."is Article 18.46 then defines "unreason-
able delays" as at least including delays in issuance of more than five years
from the date of filing or three years after a request for examination, which-
ever is later.11 9 Article 18.48 addresses delays specifically due to regulatory
processes to evaluate pharmaceuticals for marketing approval and similarly
exhorts member states to make their best efforts to grant marketing approvals
in a timely manner, without unreasonable or unnecessary delays.120 Like Ar-
ticle 18.46's provisions on patent prosecution delays, Article 18.48 also man-
dates patent term adjustment to compensate for "unreasonable curtailment of
the effective patent term" of the pharmaceutical resulting from the marketing
approval process. 12 1 Unlike Article 18.46's provisions on patent prosecution
delays, however, Article 18.48, does not define "unreasonable curtailment"
or "effective patent term," and also does allow TPP members to stipulate
"conditions and limitations" on patent term adjustments granted for market-
ing approval delays.122
The justifications for these respective patent term adjustments differ
from one another. Adjustments for patent prosecution delays stem from the
fact that, in some countries, the administrative process takes longer than pat-
ent applicants find acceptable and are aimed primarily at incentivizing more
efficient patent prosecution.123 Such administrative delays are apparently in-
evitable in developing countries such as those in Latin America (Chile, Peru,
and Mexico, in TPP's case), leading to the similar inevitability of calls for
117. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.46.1. For example, member states may implement
expedited procedures for patent prosecution. Id. art. 18.46.2.
118. Id. art. 18.46.3.
119. Id. art. 18.46.4.
120. Id. art. 18.48.1. Article 18.48.4 also states that member parties may provide for
expedited regulatory review. Id. art. 18.48.4.
121. Id. art. 18.48.2.
122. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.48.3.
123. Ryan Davis, TPP Aims To Spread US-Style IP Protections Overseas, LAw360
(Nov. 5, 2015, 10:04 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/723789/tpp-aims-
to-spread-us-style-ip-protections-overseas.
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term extensions.124 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) similarly have complained about TPP members Canada,
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam (along with nonmembers Thai-
land and Turkey) for alleged "backlogs" in patent prosecution.125 PhRMA
has also criticized India, Brazil, and Thailand for taking six to ten years to
examine biopharma patents, with one patent in Thailand reportedly issuing
only six weeks before it expired.126 Whether patent term extensions are the
proper way to remedy administrative backlogs in the patent prosecution pro-
cess, however, is unclear; the 2013 joint counterproposal did not include term
adjustments and merely exhorted member states to improve efficiency and
avoid delays.127
Term adjustments for marketing approval delays, on the other hand, ad-
vert to the fact that the incredibly long period is necessary not only for the
pharmaceutical regulatory approval process but also for pre-market product
development and clinical trials.128 And because pharma firms must typically
file patent applications on their active pharmaceutical ingredients very early
in the development process to avoid novelty and non-obviousness objections
and to establish priority, several years of the term of such active ingredient
patents will tick away before the firm even has approval to market the
drug.129 To enjoy an effective patent term that even approximates that of
patents in other technologies then, pharmaceutical firms seek patent term ex-
tensions.130 PhRMA's complaints that TPP members and others grant regula-
tory marketing approvals at rates much slower than international practice[l3
therefore may be more compelling.
The patent term adjustment provisions in the TPP have been the object
of criticism on a number of counts. First, critics accuse patent term adjust-
ment requirements as furthering evergreening of patent rights and leading to
higher drug prices. One report found that patent term extensions in the Re-
public of Korea under its FTA with the United States could increase national
124. Gustafson, supra note 24, at 2.
125. Usdin, Trans-Pacific Dreams, BIOCENTURY (Dec. 21, 2015, 2:00 AM), https://
www.biocentury.com/biocentury/politics-policy-law/2015-12-21/how-tpp-
deals-ip-provisions-read-wish-list-phrma-biologics.
126. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. OF AM. (PHRMA), SPECIAL 301 SUBMIssIoN 2016
12 (2016), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA_2016
Special.301 Submission.pdf.
127. Cox, supra note 92; Kilic, supra note 21, at 46.
128. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 304; Davis,
supra note 123.
129. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 304; Davis,
supra note 123.
130. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 304; Davis,
supra note 123.
131. SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016, supra note 126, at 19.
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drug expenditures by hundreds of millions of dollars.132 Second, patent term
adjustment systems can be complex and difficult to administer, leading to
uncertainty over patent rights.133 Imposing patent term adjustment systems on
the many countries that do not possess such systems could therefore be quite
burdensome.134 Third, the TPP has been criticized for rolling back many of
the policies encouraging access to medicines set forth in the United States'
Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (Bipartisan Trade Policy or BTP).135
This 2007 agreement set policies for congressional consideration of the FTAs
with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Korea that were negotiated around that
time.136 Although the TPP appears to embrace most of the BTP's provi-
sions,137 the TPP does not adopt the BTP policy that term adjustments should
be optional for FTA signatories and instead makes term adjustments
mandatory.138 Not surprisingly, the pharma industry lobbied heavily against
incorporation of the BTP's provisions into the TPP.139
The TPP does contain two express, but very narrow, exceptions to both
Articles 18.46 and 18.48, which appear in Annex 18-D to the agreement.
Under Annex 18-D, Peru-and apparently only Peru-can be exempted from
granting patent term adjustments in compensation for either patent office de-
lays or marketing approval delays if, despite Peru's best efforts, it cannot
obtain a waiver from Andean Decision 486, Common Industrial Property Re-
gime, and Andean Decision 689, Adequacy of Certain Articles of Decision
486.140 Andean Decision 486 is a Sub-regional Integration Agreement that
grants rights to Andean Community members Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru, to use their domestic laws to strengthen protection of patents, util-
ity models, industrial designs, trademarks, biological and genetic heritage,
and traditional knowledge. 141 Andean Decision 689 modifies Decision 486 in
relevant part to allow member countries to compensate for undue delays in
patent issuance attributable to the Patent Office except in the case of patents
132. Azam, supra note 56, at 443.
133. Kilic, supra note 21, at 44.
134. Davis, supra note 123.
135. Florko & Holdford, supra note 1.
136. USTR, BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON TRADE POLICY, BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL
(May 2007), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset
uploadfile127_11319.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Silverman, supra note 3, at 221.
139. Id. at 222.
140. TPP, supra note 37, Annex 18-D.
141. Cartagena Agreement, Decision 486, Common Provisions on Industrial Prop-
erty, Sept. 14, 2000, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=223717.
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for pharmaceutical products and processes.142 Annex 18-D could therefore
have significant implications for pharmaceutical patents in Peru if Peru is not
able to obtain a waiver of Decision 689.143 What flexibility do other TPP
members have, however?
With regard to patent term adjustments under Article 18.46 to compen-
sate for patent office delays, TPP signatories would not seem to have much
flexibility. Article 18.46 states that TPP parties "shall" adjust patent terms at
the request of the patent holder and must do so under very defined circum-
stances: if issuance is delayed for more than five years from the date of filing
or three years after a request for examination, whichever is later.144 Nonethe-
less, TPP signatories retain flexibility on a variety of aspects of patent term
adjustment.145
First, patents can be extended only if a patent has been granted. To the
extent that domestic patent systems can limit evergreening through the pat-
entability of pharmaceutical inventions, as discussed above, they also limit
evergreening through patent term extensions.146 Second, Article 18.46.4
states that in making term adjustment determinations, parties may exclude
periods "that do not occur during the processing of, or the examination of,
the patent application by the granting authority," "that are not directly attrib-
utable to the granting authority," and "that are attributable to the patent appli-
cant."l47 None of these terms are defined, leaving a signatory to define what
qualifies as "processing" or "examination of' a patent narrowly and define
what qualifies as "attributable to the patent applicant" and "not directly at-
tributable to the granting authority broadly." Signatories could thus make it
more difficult for patent applicants to show that they meet the five or three-
year minimum under Article 18.46 by excluding delays due to third-party
oppositions or other external factors.148 Third, the TPP also does not specify
how long a term adjustment must be, leaving it to individual signatories to
decide whether to compensate day-for-day for patent prosecution delays or
for just some fraction thereof.
142. Jos6 Barreda, New Andean Decision 689, IP TANGO (Aug. 20, 2008), http://
iptango.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-andean-decision-689.html.
143. Annex 18-D does stipulate that, if Peru is unable to obtain a waiver, Peru's
patent system will not discriminate on the basis of technology, place of inven-
tion, or importation or local production. "Thus, Peru confirms that the treat-
ment of pharmaceutical patents will be no less favourable than treatment of
other patents in respect to the processing and examination of patent applica-
tions." TPP, supra note 37, Annex 18-D.
144. Id. art. 18.46.4.
145. Davis, supra note 123.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 102-08.
147. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.46.4.
148. Kilic, supra note 21, at 45.
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The language of TPP Article 18.48 on patent term adjustments for de-
lays in the regulatory approval process is even more open-ended than that in
Article 18.46. Like the term extension provision for patent office delays, Ar-
ticle 18.46 does not specify how much of an adjustment must be given for
"unreasonable curtailment" of effective patent life due to the regulatory ap-
proval process and in fact does not even define what qualifies as part of the
"marketing approval process"-individual member states have the flexibility
to decide whether it includes both pre-market testing and the marketing ap-
proval process, the marketing approval process only, or just some portion
thereof. Unlike Article 18.46, TPP Article 18.48 does not specify what con-
stitutes "unreasonable curtailment" for which an adjustment must be granted,
thus allowing TPP parties to be quite parsimonious in how they determine
what pharmaceutical patents merit term adjustments.149
TPP member states also have other avenues for restricting patent term
adjustments. For one, member states appear to have carte blanche in deciding
whether to limit term adjustments under Article 18.48 to one extension per
pharmaceutical product.150 Article 18.48 allows parties to institute conditions
and limitations on term extensions for the purposes of "certainty," which
arguably could include the limitation that only one patent can be extended or,
alternatively, that extensions cannot be applied to sequential patents on new
uses or forms of known drugs on the premise that the effective patent life of a
"pharmaceutical product"151 has not been unreasonably curtailed if it has
been effectively extended by sequential patenting. In this way, the TPP's
mandate to extend patent terms to compensate for regulatory approval delays
is more limited than in other FTAs. The FTA between the United States and
South Korea, for example, specifies that term extensions for regulatory de-
lays should be applied not only to composition patents, but also to patents on
methods of using and methods of producing new pharmaceutical products.152
Another such avenue can be seen in Australia's 1990 Act, which lays
out three key restrictions on patent term extensions153 granted for regulatory
delays. First, the above-mentioned Article 78 establishes carve-outs from in-
fringement liability during the extended term of a pharmaceutical patent.154
Second, Article 78 establishes formal procedures for challenging such exten-
149. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 8.
150. Kilic, supra note 21, at 46.
151. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.48.2.
152. Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic
of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., art. 18.8.6(b), June 30, 2007, USTR, http://www.ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalkorus/asset-uploadfile273_127
17.pdf.
153. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch. 6 pt. 3 s 70 sub-divs (2)-(3) (Austl.).
154. Id. at 78.
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sions.iss Third, Article 70 of the 1990 Act sets limits on term adjustments,
allowing a patent to be extended only if at least five years have elapsed be-
tween patent issuance and marketing approval.15 6 These limits on patent term
extensions due to the regulatory approval process are particularly important,
given that regulatory delays are unique to pharmaceutical patents.1 57
V. PATENT LINKAGE
A third type of provision in the TPP that could have a major impact on
the price and availability of drugs is patent linkage, another patent-related
provision unique to the pharmaceutical industry. Article 18.51 of the TPP
mandates that no one can obtain regulatory marketing approval for a patented
drug unless they either own the patent rights to the drug, or have given the
patent holder notice and opportunity to address any potential patent infringe-
ment.1 58 Patent linkage thus imposes the burden of knowing the patent status
of all approved drugs and then policing potential infringement of those pat-
ents on the regulatory agency that monitors pharmaceutical marketing, re-
gardless of whether they have any expertise in patent law.159 As a result,
regulatory authorities are left simply to trust in the validity of patents alleged
to cover a given drug, despite the fact that this would lead to blocking ap-
proval of cheaper generic versions of the drug that may or may not actually
infringe the asserted patents.1 60
Critics of patent linkage see it as yet further promoting patent evergree-
ning in this regard-as long as a pharmaceutical firm can continue obtaining
sequential patent rights to its drugs, it can continue blocking generic market
entry for the drug through patent linkage.161 This risk appears to be particu-
larly acute for drugs synthesized through biological process (biologics), as
biologics typically are subject to many more patents than other types of
drugs.162 Furthermore, critics ask why patent linkage is even necessary. Pat-
155. Id.
156. El-Said, supra note 4, at 426-27.
157. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 304; Davis,
supra note 123.
158. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.51.1.
159. FREDERICK M. ABBoTr, THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CONTRADICTORY TREND IN BILATERAL AND RE-
GIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 8 (2004), http://www.quno.org/sites/default/
files/resources/TRIPS-Public-Health-FTAs.pdf; Kilic, supra note 21, at 52.
160. ABBOTT, supra note 159, at 8.
161. Michael Grunwald, Leaked: What's in Obama's Trade Deal, POLITICO (July 1,
2015), http://www.politico.com/agendalstory/2015/06/tpp-deal-leaked-pharma-
000126?hp=tlr.
162. Id.; Eugenia Costanza Laurenza, The Scope of 'Patent Linkage' in the US-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement and the Potential Effects on International
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ent linkage is not required under the TRIPS agreement, 163 and why should
pharmaceutical patent holders benefit from what is effectively agency en-
forcement of their patent rights?164
Those who defend patent linkage argue that it protects both those who
hold patents on marketed drugs as well as those who seek to offer generic
versions of them. Patent linkage saves generic manufacturers from liability
for patent infringement damages by stopping them before they incur such
liability by going on the market.165 It also protects pharmaceutical patent
holders, not only by blocking generic market entry, but also by preventing
premature generic entry from even temporarily lowering drug prices in a one-
way ratchet from which it is difficult to raise drug prices.166 In addition, pat-
ent linkage may help provide greater legal certainty and thereby encourage
generic market entry. 167 Once patent holders learn that generics are manufac-
turing versions of the patent holders' drugs, generics are likely to face patent
infringement claims regardless of patent linkage. Given this inevitability,
perhaps generics would be more likely to apply for marketing approval if
they were able to receive earlier notice of what patents stand in their way,
and a chance to resolve any potential patent infringement before liability is
incurred.
But some critics worry that establishing a patent linkage system could
be counterproductive when discovering that the patent status of a particular
drug is too difficult.168 These critics are also concerned that compiling list-
ings of applicable pharmaceutical patents, similar to the Orange Book main-
tained by the United States Food and Drug Administration, could be difficult
for developing countries to organize.169
This concern overlooks the fact that Article 18.5 of the TPP applies only
if pharmaceutical manufacturers must seek regulatory approval to market
their drugs. The regulatory authority at issue presumably conditions such ap-
proval on some form of application, accompanied by some quantity of sup-
porting information.170 Given that they must already be in direct contact with
Trade Agreements, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 439, 442 (2015); see also David E.
Adelman & Christopher M. Holman, Misplaced Fears in the Legislative Battle
Over Affordable Biotech Drugs, 50 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 565 (2010) (defining
biologics and noting the complexity of patents that protect them).
163. Silverman, supra note 3, at 219.
164. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 308.
165. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 7-8.
166. Id.
167. Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines, supra note 5, at 1.
168. Chakrabarti, supra note 10, at 330.
169. Shah, supra note 14.
170. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.51.1. (explaining that under Article 18.51, patent
linkage applies only if a member state permits manufacturers to seek marketing
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the regulatory authority to submit such information, manufacturers could eas-
ily be required to submit information about any relevant patents rights that
they believe apply to the drugs for which they are seeking approval, from
which a central listing of patents can be constructed. The regulatory authority
could then penalize applicants who refuse or fail to submit a list of relevant
patents by effectively deeming those applicants to have waived the benefit of
blocking subsequent generic applications via patent linkage. Article 18.51 of
the TPP requires only that "a system" be put in place to provide notice to
patent holders that others are seeking to market their products.171 Article
18.51 does not specify what form that system should take, apparently leaving
each TPP member to craft a system for themselves.172 And while Article
18.51 does call for patent holders to be afforded adequate time and opportu-
nity to seek available remedies before others are granted approval to market
their patented drugs, the Article appears to require such opportunities only
for those patent holders who have received notice-173 i.e., those who partici-
pated in the "system" by duly submitting information on any patents to
which their drugs are subject.
The need to allow time and opportunity to seek remedies for potential
patent infringement can nonetheless unduly delay generic market entry, espe-
cially if the patents at issue are ultimately held to be invalid.i74 The TPP does
not specify exactly what procedures signatory members should use to resolve
disputes over pharmaceutical patents, nor does it demand that any patent dis-
putes be fully resolved before a generic can be granted marketing ap-
proval.175 Nor does Article 18.51 set a minimum for what constitutes
"adequate time and opportunity" or require that patent holders be given time
to do anything other than "seek" (as opposed to "secure") available
remedies. 176
Perhaps more to the point, patent linkage becomes an issue only to the
extent that there is a patent to link regulatory marketing approval to. Patent
linkage can unnecessarily delay generic market entry, but so can the in ter-
approval of a drug previously approved for marketing by relying in effect on
the safety and efficacy data submitted by the previously approved manufacturer
(called a "right of reference"), rather than by submitting their own data. Patent
holders must have submitted safety and efficacy data before they can enjoy the
benefit of patent linkage.).
171. Id. art. 18.51.1.a.
172. See id. art. 18.51.
173. Id. art. 18.51.1.b. (the Article states that TPP members must provide "adequate
time and opportunity for such a patent holder to seek ... available remedies,"
by which the Article seems to refer to the patent holder providing notice under
the system established under 18.51.1.a.) (emphasis added).
174. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 308.
175. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 8.
176. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.51.1.b.
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rorem effect of simply threatening a patent infringement lawsuit-or indeed,
simply filing a patent application.177 Limiting patent rights to pharmaceuti-
cals or other technologies through heightened patentability standards, restric-
tions on patentable subject matter, exceptions to patent infringement liability,
pre-grant oppositions, and so on can reduce the effect not only of patent
linkage but also of patent exclusivity itself. To the extent that member states
were concerned about how the TPP's patent-related provisions might affect
access to medicines, exercising the various levers and flexibilities available
to them might have helped weaken the effect these provisions could have
had.
VI. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS TO MEDICINES
While patent exclusivity over pharmaceuticals can have a significant
impact on drug prices and availability, patents are by no means the only
factors with serious repercussions for access to medicines. For example, the
data exclusivities that many developed countries grant only to pharmaceuti-
cals may have implications for drug prices by making it more difficult for
generic versions of drugs to obtain regulatory marketing approval.178 The
safety and efficacy data generated through clinical trials of drugs is generally
quite costly, but generic drug manufacturers can avoid incurring these costs
(and avoid passing these costs on to patients through higher drug prices) by
asking for a "right of reference" to data previously submitted to the regula-
tory authority. In effect, data exclusivities delay the time at which generics
can rely on rights of reference, thereby delaying the time at which generics
can enter the market. 179 Data exclusivities typically run concurrently with any
relevant patent protections, but also protect even unpatentable drugs and
biologics. 180
Data exclusivities are a common feature of all recent U.S.-negotiated
FTAs81 and the TPP is no exception. The TPP includes two different data
exclusivities for pharmaceuticals and, for the first time in any trade agree-
ment, extends data exclusivity to biologics as well.182 Critics argue that im-
posing data exclusivities on developing countries is unnecessary, particularly
when a drug is already protected by data exclusivities in one or more devel-
oping countries.83 Not surprisingly, developing countries have stepped up
177. Outterson, supra note 93, at 257.
178. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 308.
179. Gustafson, supra note 24, at 2.
180. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 306;
Chakrabarti, supra note 10, at 332; Cox, supra note 92.
181. Branstetter, supra note 8, at 6.
182. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.52.
183. Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
777, 784-85 (2010).
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their objections to the imposition of regulatory exclusivities in FTAs.184 The
Annex to the TPP's intellectual property chapter does provide some modifi-
cations to its data exclusivity for Malaysia, Peru, and Chile, but these modifi-
cations are modest at best.
Enhanced patent or data exclusivities are unlikely to have a significant
effect on drug prices in countries that impose drug price controls, as most
countries employ some form of price controls for drugs.185 In countries with
national health insurance systems, the government can control drug prices
through reference pricing and using its monopsony power to negotiate for
lower drug prices.186 Pharmaceutical firms also price discriminate between
countries and voluntarily reduce their drug prices in response to threats of
being delisted from national formularies87 or having their patents subject to
compulsory licensing.188
The TPP does not prohibit such governmental price control strategies,
but it does require that decisions regarding drug formulary listing and reim-
bursement be transparent.1 89 Furthermore, the TPP mandates that pricing and
listing decisions be reviewable on an applicant's request.1 90 It is this latter
provision in particular that concerns critics of the TPP, as it gives private
pharmaceutical companies a chance to challenge pricing decisions and at-
tempt to compel listings of their drugs at higher prices.191 Whether this re-
view mechanism would have led to higher drug prices is not clear, as the TPP
Annex explicitly allows drug pricing based on either a "competitive market"
or on "therapeutic significance,"92 thus allowing TPP signatories to base
drug pricing on criteria other than the manufacturer's asked-for price.193
The TPP also gives signatories carte blanche to choose a patent exhaus-
tion regime that allows parallel importation of lower-priced generic drugs
184. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 30, at 335-37.
185. Azam, supra note 56, at 449.
186. Id. at 450; Branstetter, supra note 8, at 10; Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 3, at
728; Outterson, supra note 93, at 205, 214.
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188. Id.; Outterson, supra note 93, at 224.
189. TPP, supra note 37, Annex 26-A art. 3(c).
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US and Elsewhere, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 4 (Mar. 8, 2016); Kapczynski et al.,
supra note 9; Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 3, at 728-29.
192. TPP, supra note 37, Annex 26-A art. 2(d).
193. See Azam, supra note 56, at 455-56 (noting that withdrawal of price controls
does not always lead to higher drug prices); see also Lopert & Gleeson, supra
note 6, at 204.
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manufactured in other countries.194 Developing countries, for example, can
employ an international patent exhaustion rule such that the first sale of a
lower-priced pharmaceutical anywhere in the world exhausts any patent right
over it, thereby depriving the patent holder of any power to object to export
or other disposition of the drug.195 An international exhaustion rule thus en-
ables the import of drugs from countries where they are being sold at lower
prices, enhancing access to medicine in smaller, less wealthy markets.196
The TPP also preserves signatories' rights to avail themselves of the
compulsory licensing provision under Article 31 of TRIPS.197 Compulsory
licensing allows governments to use or grant a license to a private party to
use a patented invention without the patent holder's permission and at a rate
other than what the patent holder might have demanded.198 In this way, com-
pulsory licenses can serve to lower patented drug prices below what the pat-
ent holder might wish.199
Finally, the TPP also contains a number of other provisions designed to
increase access to medicines and lower drug prices. These provisions include
lowering import tariffs, reducing customs barriers, eliminating internal barri-
ers to drug distribution, and minimizing discriminatory and non-transparent
(and sometimes corrupt)200 regulatory regimes.201
But even if TPP signatories were to take advantage of the flexibilities
and workarounds allowed them, they still might find themselves subject to
the threat of some form of retaliation.202 Under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act, 2 03 for example, the United States regularly monitors its trade partners to
see whether they are providing adequate protections for intellectual property
rights or are erecting what the United States perceives as trade barriers to
U.S. goods and businesses. Countries that the United States deems to have
the most egregiously insufficient IP protections may face trade sanctions,
although most offender countries are simply placed on non-statutory "watch
lists," most often for failures to provide adequate IP protections for the phar-
194. TPP, supra note 37, art. 18.11.
195. Outterson, supra note 93, at 209-10.
196. Id.; Azam, supra note 56, at 426.
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203. 19 U.S.C.A § 2242 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-30) (Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 as amended by Section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988).
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maceutical industry.204 The effects of being placed on a Section 301 list are
unclear.
Chapter 28 of the TPP also establishes a mechanism for member-to-
member complaints to be filed for dispute resolution, much like the similar
mechanism that exists under TRIPS.205 Perhaps more worrisome is the dis-
pute mechanism established under the TPP-the investor-state dispute settle-
ment process (ISDS), found in the investment chapter of the TPP.206 Unlike
the separate inter-governmental dispute resolution mechanism under Chapter
28, ISDS permits foreign-but not domestic-private investors to bring arbi-
tration claims against countries that allegedly impair "investments" such as
intellectual property rights.207 The ISDS mechanism thus could have deterred
TPP signatories from exercising any available flexibilities to rein in patent
rights over pharmaceuticals.208 And while for political reasons national gov-
ernments may be loath to bring complaints for dispute settlement, private
firms may not be so unwilling, and are increasingly using ISDS mechanisms
in other trade agreements to file complaints against foreign laws.209 The
ISDS mechanism was particularly controversial and threatened to stall TPP
negotiations.210 But the negotiating parties did manage to institute a number
of provisions for dismissing frivolous claims, emphasizing the rights of gov-
ernments to legislate in their citizens' interest, carving out disputes over
compulsory licenses, drug listing, pricing decisions, and other safeguards.211
One final category of factors that may pose the most formidable obsta-
cle to access to medicines is, of course, lack of resources. Developing coun-
tries often lack the resources to establish distribution networks for medicine
through investments in transportation, hospitals, public health programs, and
healthcare professionals.212 As the United States Trade Representative's
white paper during the TPP negotiations noted, trade policy alone cannot
solve challenges hindering access to medicines.213 Foreign assistance and de-
velopment programs, work on domestic public health issues, and many other
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initiatives are necessary to address guaranteed access to medicines on a
meaningful level.214
VII. CONCLUSION
Other authors have written extensively about the flexibilities that trade
agreement signatory countries have in implementing agreements such as the
TPP.215 This article is not the first to mention the fact that, despite the historic
lack of push back against the demands of the United States and other devel-
oped countries in proposing such agreements, there are increasing instances
of developing and least-developed countries resisting these proposals and
countering them with proposals of their own. The TPP negotiating parties
appear to have been surprisingly successful in their efforts to soften many of
the patent-related provisions in the TPP and to preserve a fair amount of
flexibility in the way that they would have implemented those provisions.
Whether this success was due to the multilateral nature of the TPP-allowing
negotiating parties to form more powerful blocs with sufficient net economic
power to influence negotiations-is unclear. Now that the TPP is a dead
letter, however, we cannot know how much use, and to what effect, the flex-
ibilities under the agreement would have had.
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